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INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is a powerful piece of
legislation devised by Congress in 1970 as a potential solution to the growing problem of
organized crime in the United States. The expansive language applied in drafting the statute, in
addition to a lack of distinct guidance by the Supreme Court, have facilitated RICO's use as a
weapon against a broad spectrum of defendants.
A key feature of RICO is its emphasis on the "enterprise" through which at least two
predicate crimes are committed. The government has targeted defendants from an array of
societal niches, prosecuting these individuals for their association with "enterprises" that have
manifested themselves in a variety of forms.
This article focuses on the RICO "enterprise" and demonstrates the malleability of the
enterprise prong in RICO indictments. I will provide three case studies involving the criminal
prosecution of RICO defendants in the contexts of: (1) organized crime, (2) the financial sector
and (3) political corruption. Through these examples and a brief description of the legislation






B. Prohibited Activities (18 U.S.C. §1962) . ......................... 36
C. Criminal Penalties (18 U.S.C. § 1963)..........................38
III. The Concept of Enterprise........................................39
IV. Case Studies ........... 4
A. United States v. Salerno.....................................41
B. United States v. Mi/ken....................... ............... 44
C. United States v. Cianci.....................................46
V. Conclusion......................................... ......... 48
1
Zev Koblentz: Criminal RICO Enterprise via Salerno, Milken, and Cianci, The
Published by Duquesne Scholarship Collection, 2009
Hummel v. Rosemeyer
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cannot truly be
understood or appreciated without a snapshot of the context within which it was passed.
Prior to the passage of RICO, the government's primary weapon against organized crime - at the
time dominated by the Italian Mafia or "La Cosa Nostra" - was the 1946 Hobbs Act (prohibiting
robbery and extortion affecting interstate commerce).' In 1963, Joseph Valachi, the first member
of La Cosa Nostra to turn state's witness, testified before the Senate's McClellan Hearings which
had been investigating organized crime in the United States.2 Valachi provided never-before
heard insight into the organization of the Mafia and its hierarchical structure. 3 The McClellan
hearings, in addition to the 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime (the "Katzenbach
Commission"), allowed Congress to develop a better understanding of crime in the U.S. 4 The
government now acknowledged not only the strength and sophistication of La Cosa Nostra but
also the breadth of crimes its members committed.
In 1970, Congress passed the Omnibus Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) in an
effort to strengthen the arsenal with which U.S. attorneys addressed organized criminality. 6
Included within the Act was the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)7 ,
providing prosecutors with a new formidable weapon to use against the Mafia and other criminal
elements. A key feature of RICO was its focus on the concept of an "enterprise" 9 through
which "a pattern of racketeering activity"10 was committed. In the past, prosecutors went after
organized crime figures who had committed specific individual crimes, many of which carried
light sentences and were performed by low-level operatives.II This, in turn, allowed those sitting
at the top of Valachi's hierarchy to remain relatively insulated.12 RICO enables prosecutors to
bring criminal charges against high-level, powerful criminals simply for their association with
the broader "enterprise" through which predicate crimes are committed.13 The vastly enhanced
penalties, both civil and criminal, further added to the power of the new crime-busting
legislation. 14
RICO may have been enacted with organized crime as its target, but the law's expansive
notion of an "enterprise" has facilitated its use against a wide variety of criminals.' 5 Robert G.
Blakey, architect of the RICO statute, steadfastly holds that RICO was not created solely as a
* Brian Goodwin, Civil versus Criminal Rico and the "Eradication" of La Cosa Nostra, NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT, Summer 2002, at 289.
2 Id. at 290.
Id. at 290-91.
4. Id. at 290.
. While this is a characteristic of many advanced criminal syndicates, the Mafia was the biggest
threat confronting the nation at the time.
6 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 279.
7. Id.
. See id. at 292-93.
9. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (2006).
10. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1).
1i. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 301.
12 Id.
3 Id. at 295, 301.
14 Id. at 300-01.
15 Id. at 298-99.
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weapon against the Mafia.16 He notes Justice Brennan's decision in HJi Inc. v. Northwestern
Tel. Co.,17 in which the former Justice writes:
The notion that RICO is limited to organized crime finds no support in the Act's
text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history.... Congress for cogent
reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had
organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime.18
Supporting Justice Brennan and Robert Blakey's position is a clause Congress attached to the
statute mandating that RICO be applied liberally.19 This clause, which has been subject to much
controversy, directs that "[lt]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 20 Blakey and other commentators point out that such a clause distinguishes
RICO from much federal criminal law, which is regularly construed strictly for due process
21reasons.
With this remedial directive in mind, prosecutors have brought RICO charges not only
against organized criminals but also against commercial enterprises, corporate executives and
politicians.22 While the targets of RICO prosecutions have been diverse, the substance of the
"RICO enterprise" itself has also been varied.23 This heterogeneity demonstrates that whatever
the initial intent of its framers, the law has become a catch-all tool in the government's fight
against fraud in a variety of settings.
II. THE STATUTE
A. INTRODUCTION
Many believe the true purpose of the RICO statute, despite Blakey's position and its
broad contemporary application, was to help U.S. attorneys address the problem of organized
crime.24 The "successful" criminal organizations had begun to either filter proceeds from illegal
ventures into legal enterprises or establish control over legal enterprises through illegal activity
25(e.g. through extortion). These scenarios contemplated the infiltration of legal organizations by
organized crime, a concern that had grown since the McClellan Hearings and Katzenbach
Commission.26 In order to stymie these ambitious organizations and their leaders, Congress
1. * Robert G. Blakey, Symposium: Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879 (1990).
1. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
19 Id. at 243, 247.
19 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 299.
20 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
21. Blakey, supra note 16, at 873, 876; Barry Tarlow, Rico Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 309 (1983).
22 Id. at 880.
23. This is at least partly the result of the statutory language defining the RICO "enterprise" in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4).
24 Ilene H. Nagel & Sheldon J. Plager, Rico, Past and Future: Some observations and Conclusions,
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 456 (1983) "As the Act itself says in its statement of findings and purpose: 'The Congress finds
that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity...; (2)
organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as
syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property...;(3) this money and power are increasingly
used to infiltrate and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes."' Id.
25 Blakey, supra note 16, at 873-74.
26. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 2901-91.
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made the criminal defendant's relationship to the RICO "enterprise" a focal point of the statute. 27
Due to the emphasis on this relationship, as opposed to the activities of low-level criminals, it
soon became evident that RICO had great potential as federal criminal law.
While effective in combating such infiltration, the statute neither requires the government
to show the existence of any organized crime activity nor the infiltration of a legal enterprise by
such criminals. 28  Whether intended by its crafters or not, the expansive language used in
drafting the legislation has enabled prosecutors to target criminals of all varieties for their mere
association with virtually any form of enterprise. 29 These enterprises may be legal entities or
loose "associations in fact." 30 Therefore, a gangster's association with his own "mafia family"
would bring the gangster defendant within RICO's reach just as a bond salesman's job at a large
investment bank could similarly subject him to criminal liability when the other elements of
RICO are met.
B. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (18 U.S.C. § 1962)
The RICO statute is embodied in 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968. The primary section, 18
U.S.C. §1962, has four subsections - (a), (b), (c) and (d) - that outline the activities prohibited by
law. The sections that perhaps most clearly reflect the intended purpose of RICO as a tool
against the infiltration of legitimate enterprises, §1962(a) and §1962(b), are ironically the least
utilized.3 1 Simply put, § 1962(a) regulates investment in an "enterprise" that would be lawful but
for the illegal source of the funds, whereas §1962(b) targets the acquisition of an "enterprise"
through unlawful means. 32
Section 1962(c) is the broadest of the four subsections and is utilized by prosecutors most
often. 33 The government regularly turns to § 1962(c) because the relationship the government
must prove-between the defendant and enterprise-is not a particularly close one. 34  The
burden on prosecutors in subsection (c) is merely to show that the defendant was "associated
with" or "employed by" the enterprise named in the indictment. 35 The expansive list of such
enterprises and relatively weak connection that must be proven between the enterprise and
defendant means that prosecutors have a lot of flexibility in shaping the government's case. 36
Section 1962(c) makes illegal: (1) A defendant person, (2) employed by or associated with any
enterprise, (3) who engages in or affects interstate or foreign commerce, (4) conducts or
participates, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs, (5) through a
pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt. 37 Therefore, the "person" who
indirectly participates in the affairs of an enterprise, through his illegal actions, is potentially
27 Id. at 292.
28 Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 871, 891 (2008).
29 Id. The infiltration of legal enterprises by organized crime took a back seat largely because it was
more difficult to prove and limited RICO's use. The statute's real success came from allowing prosecutors to target
a defendant for his relationship to any "enterprise" with which he was associated. Id.
.0 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 298.
31 See Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 28, 889-91.
32 David M. Ludwick, Restricting RICO: Narrowing the Scope of Enterprise, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB
POL'Y 381, 383 (1993).
33. See Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 28.
34. Id. at 891.
35. Id.
36
. See 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
.7 See 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).
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subject to RICO's penalties due to mere association with that enterprise.38
Although 18 U.S.C. §1961 defines what is meant by many of the terms used in the
statute's prohibited activities, it leaves many questions unanswered and provides great flexibility
to government enforcers. 39 A defendant can include "any individual or entity capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property." 40 Thus, a corporation can be the defendant person in a
RICO prosecution.41 An "enterprise" is defined almost without limitation; it can be an
"individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 42 The breadth of such definitions has
facilitated multiple prosecutions of persons having absolutely no ties to organized crime. 43
Augmenting this is the above-noted fact that § 1962(c) holds a person or entity liable for merely
being "employed by or associated with any enterprise" that is engaged in interstate commerce.44
A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires the commission of two predicate acts of
racketeering by a defendant within ten years of each other.45 A prosecutor is permitted to use a
prior conviction as one or more of the predicate acts, but it is not required.46  Beyond prior
convictions, time-barred offenses can be predicate acts as long as the other elements of RICO are
met.47 Predicate acts can include: "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance
. . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year."48 Amongst the notable federal law violations are mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, and securities fraud.49
38
.8 At this point, it may be helpful to the reader to elaborate slightly on the greater burden facing the
government in §1962(a) and §1962(b) prosecutions. Like §1962(c), both (a) and (b) require a defendant person to
have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(a) additionally requires that a defendant "use or
invest" any part of the income derived from his racketeering activity in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of' an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce. Meanwhile, § 1962(b)
additionally requires that a defendant, through a pattern of racketeering activity, "acquire or maintain" an "interest in
or control of' an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce. Simply put, the RICO violation in
§ 1962(c) stems primarily from the pattern of racketeering activity itself; the defendant's association with the broad
enterprise concept can be displayed in a variety of ways and the burden on the government with respect to this
element is not a weighty one. In § 1962(a), the violation stems from the investment of proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering activity in an enterprise. In § 1962(b), the violation stems from control obtained over an enterprise
through the pattern of racketeering. In sum, proving a § 1962(a) or § 1962(b) violation requires more of the
government and appears to more readily implicate the existence of a legal enterprise to prove investment in or
acquisition of control over that entity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
39 See Blakey, supra note 16.
40. 18 U.S.C. §1961(3).
41. See L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1050 (1990).
42. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).
43. Ludwick, supra note 32, at 381.
44. Id.
45 18 U.S.C. §1961(5).
46. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 293-94. However, if a civil RICO claim is predicated on a securities
fraud violation, the defendant must first be criminally convicted of that violation. Id.
47 United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1367 (2d Cir. 1994).
48. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1).
49. Id. The list is extensive and these are notable solely because of their applicability to both
organized crime and non-organized crime; "The American Bar Association has expressed concern that abuse of
broadly worded predicate offenses such as mail fraud may result in the imposition of disproportionately severe
criminal sanctions and a flood of RICO civil actions. To remedy this problem, the American Bar Association has
recommended that a racketeering pattern include at least one offense other than mail fraud and wire fraud, interstate
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The final prohibited activity, § 1962(d), makes it illegal to "conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)."50  The conspiracy count has been the subject of
Supreme Court decisions. 51 The law does not require that a defendant personally commit or
agree to commit the two predicate acts required to prove a pattern of racketeering activity. 52
Instead, a defendant must simply "intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would
satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopted the
goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor." 53  A defendant may therefore be
convicted of a RICO conspiracy and be acquitted of both the underlying predicate charges and a
RICO substantive offense. 54 It is notable that none of the four subsections defining prohibited
activities contain any attached mens rea. Therefore, only the predicate offenses underlying the
pattern of racketeering activity in a criminal RICO prosecution contain the mens rea needed to
convict a defendant.55
C. CRIMINAL PENALTIES (18 U.S.C. §1963)
The criminal penalties resulting from a successful RICO prosecution are enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 1963. A defendant convicted under § 1962 of the statute faces a twenty-year prison
sentence, a fine, or both.56 If the predicate acts of racketeering upon which the charges are based
are substantive federal crimes, a defendant faces higher cumulative maximum statutory penalties
and the chance of consecutive sentences. 57 A guilty defendant also faces a sentence of life
imprisonment if that is the statutory punishment attached to the predicate.58
The remedy of forfeiture is available to prosecutors in RICO prosecutions. 59  The
government may seek forfeiture of "inter alia, any interest acquired or maintained in violation of
§1962, any interest in any enterprise operated in violation of §1962, and any property
constituting, or derived from, the proceeds of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962.",60 A
court can enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a performance bond, or
take other actions necessary to freeze property for forfeiture. 61 Forfeiture proceedings can
commence once an indictment is filed or even before it is filed, if there is a showing that the
prosecution will likely prevail and that the failure to enter such an order may result in the
property's unavailability in the future. 62 While forfeiture provisions were included due to the
fear that assets will no longer be available should judgment be entered, federal prosecutors are
transportation of stolen goods, or sale or receipt of stolen goods." Tarlow, supra note 21, at 367; interestingly, the
Hobbs Act fulfilled its potential through its use as a RICO predicate. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 290.
50 18 U.S.C. §1962(d).
51 See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61-66 (1997).
52 Id. at 61-66.
53. Id. at 65.
54. See United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004).
5. United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).
.6 18 U.S.C. §1963(a).
5. JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME, 679 (4th ed. 2009).
.8 18 U.S.C. §1963(a).
59 For a critique of this remedy, see Crovitz, supra note 41.
61 O'SULLIVAN, supra note 57, at 678.
61 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 300.
62. 18 U.S.C. §1963(d).
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often criticized for applying the threat of pre-trial asset freezes in very different circumstances. 63
III. THE CONCEPT OF ENTERPRISE
The spectrum of enterprises implicated in RICO prosecutions reflects the statute's
breadth and coverage. Again, the expansive list of entities defined as an enterprise in §1961(4)
"includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." It is notable that this
list is preceded by the word "includes," leaving open the likelihood that it is not exhaustive but
rather illustrative. 64
When the enterprise in question is in fact a legal entity (like Drexel Burnham Lambert,
discussed below), the enterprise element is easily satisfied. 65 This relatively straightforward
application of the statute would be covered by the definitional language: "any.. .corporation... or
other legal entity." 66 Naming entities in the financial sector as the "enterprise" in a RICO
prosecution is also greatly facilitated by a number of powerful RICO predicate acts that tend to
implicate typical business activities.67 The inclusion of these broad and ambiguous white collar
predicates-like mail and wire fraud-stemmed from the fear that organized crime was and
would continue to expand its reach into the world of legitimate business.68 Not only may the use
of such expansive language have been justified, but there was no easy way to statutorily limit the
targets of RICO prosecutions to organized crime.69 Congress was wary about making mere
membership in the Mafia or another criminal organization illegal.70 Since the Supreme Court
had prohibited such status crimes as unconstitutional, Congress could not make it illegal to be
classified as a certain kind of person without having committed any specific violation.71
Therefore, due to the scope of the statute's enterprise language and its inclusion of certain
predicate acts, large financial sector firms are not immune from involvement despite the lack of
- 72
an organized crime presence.
The enterprise element is often applied in a less orthodox and more creative fashion in
§ 1962(c) prosecutions when wholly legal entities are not implicated.73 As stated above,
subsection (c) makes it unlawful for a person "associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or
participate . .. in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs" through his pattern of racketeering
activity. 74 A defendant can therefore be prosecuted solely for his association with an ambiguous
kind of enterprise defined by RICO as any "group of individuals associated in fact although not a
63 Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1060. Large Wall Street firms such as Princeton/Newport Partners and
Drexel Burnham Lambert have been threatened with the pre-trial freezing of investor assets that can potentially
accompany a RICO indictment. Prosecutors have used this strategy to compel settlements by principals at these
firms. See id.
64. Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 28, at 88 1-82.
65 Id. at 884.
66 18 U.S.C §1961(4).
67 Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1053.
68 Id. at 1054-55.
69. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 297-98.
70 Id.
'7i Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1051-52.
72. See Crovitz, supra note 41.
73. Ludwick, supra note 32, 387-390.
74. 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).
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legal entity."75  Implicated in this statutory language is the involvement of a less cohesive
enterprise called an "association in fact." 76  The Supreme Court has addressed the myriad
questions raised by a RICO association in fact enterprise through its decisions in both United
States v. Turkette77 and Boyle v. United States. 8
An association in fact enterprise, as per RICO, is simply a collection of individuals that
have come together, but are not legally recognized as such. 79 The Turkette decision reinforced a
view that had been prevalent in the Circuits: 0 the notion that an association in fact enterprise can
be an entirely illegal entity.81 Writing for the Court in Turkette, Justice White remarked:
Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have
narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.' But
it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals
was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively
criminal. 82
If an association in fact enterprise can exist for an entirely criminal purpose, what separates its
pattern of racketeering activity from its existence as an "enterprise" in the first place? 83
In Turkette, the Court attempted to elaborate upon what is necessary to show the
enterprise element (in an association in fact scenario) apart from the defendant's pattern of
racketeering activity.84 While holding that the underlying pattern of racketeering and the
enterprise are in fact distinct elements, the Court did not insist that the enterprise have a clearly
ascertainable structure. Therefore, the proof needed to establish each of the two elements can
in fact coalesce, while mindful that proof of one does not necessarily supply proof of the other. 86
The decision held that an association in fact enterprise consists of "a group of people associated
together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct."87 Such an enterprise can be
demonstrated by an ongoing organization-formal or informal-and by evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit.
Following Turkette, different circuits required a varying amount of proof with respect to
75 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).
76. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
7. Id.
.8 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009).
79. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).
so. Tarlow, supra note 21, at 325.
si. It is important to note that the RICO enterprise can also be a multifaceted association in fact that is
comprised of (1) a collection of individuals with a criminal agenda and (2) legitimate entities that these individuals
control or are affiliated with.
82 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581.
83 Such an issue may arise when there is a small group of petty criminals that rob grocery stores
together. Even though the pattern of racketeering activity may be satisfied through their predicate crimes, the
government is still statutorily obligated to prove that the defendant criminals were associated in fact as a separate
element of the RICO violation. The question confronting the court was the extent to which the pattern of
racketeering (the underlying predicate acts) could, without more, prove the enterprise element.
84. * Again, this issue arises particularly when dealing with small and loosely-affiliated criminal groups
that may commit crimes, but do not necessarily have any separate structure, function or relationship. Ludwick,
supra note 32, at 385.
.5 See Turkette, 452 U.S. 576.
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the enterprise element when dealing with an illegal association in fact.89 A majority of the
circuits interpreted Turkette as requiring the prosecution to prove some ascertainable structure
beyond the predicates constituting the pattern of racketeering. 90 The Supreme Court did not
attempt to resolve this conflict until 2009 when it reached a decision in Boyle. 9' The Court held
that a criminal association in fact enterprise may exist if it has a purpose, sufficient longevity to
accomplish that purpose, and relationships among associates (which can be inferred from the
underlying acts without a distinct structural hierarchy).92 The prosecution-friendly decision
defines an association in fact broadly and appears only to require a very limited existence beyond
a defendant's predicate acts to prove the enterprise element. 93
IV. CASE STUDIES
The following three case studies demonstrate the various forms an "enterprise" can take
in criminal RICO prosecutions. The first addresses the RICO enterprise within the organized
crime context and offers an example of an enterprise that is composed of a purely illegal
association in fact. The second looks at the financial sector and provides an example of a
seemingly legal entity named as the enterprise. The third involves an association in fact
enterprise with legal and illegal components in the context of political corruption.
A. UNITED STA TES v SALERNO 94
As stated at the outset, federal prosecutors faced considerable odds in bringing charges
and securing convictions against prominent figures in organized crime. 95 Congress corrected this
problem by making "once untouchable criminals responsible for the acts of their subordinates." 96
This effort was extremely successful in the Southern District of New York, where then U.S.
Attorney Rudolph Giuliani aggressively pursued the five La Cosa Nostra "families" and their
board of directors, "the Commission."97 The Salerno case provides a valuable insight into the
concept of a RICO "enterprise."
La Cosa Nostra was and continues to be composed of five families in the greater New
York City area: the Genovese Family, the Gambino Family, the Colombo Family, the Bonanno
Family and the Lucchese Family.98 Through a massive FBI investigation initiated in 1980 called
"Operation GENUS," the government gathered evidence by which it was able to outline the
structure, hierarchy and activities in which each of the five families engaged. 99 This evidence
was used in a number of prosecutions targeting organized crime, the largest of which was the
89 Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 28, at 885
9o. Id. The Second and Eleventh Circuits allowed proof of the predicate acts constituting the pattern
of racketeering to prove the existence of the enterprise itself. Id. at 886.
91 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009).
92 Id. at 2244.
93. See id.
94. 868 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1989).
95. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 301.
96 Id. at 300.
97 JAMES B. JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB, 5 (New York University Press 1994).
98. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 305.
99. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 80 ("Operation GENUS coordinated federal, state, and local agencies:
FBI agents, New York City detectives and officers, assistant U.S. attorneys, as well as New York State Organized
Crime Task Force attorneys and investigators.").
9
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1985-86 case, United States v. Salerno, also known as "The Commission Case." 00
Through Operation GENUS and various informants, the government learned about the
existence of a supervisory body called "the Commission," which was comprised of the bosses of
all five families in addition to a number of high-level subordinates.' 0' The original Salerno
indictment charged eleven people with §1962(c) substantive RICO and §1962(d) RICO
conspiracy counts.102 The government built its case around the theory that "the Cosa Nostra
commission constituted a criminal enterprise; that each defendant was a member or functionary
of the commission; and that each defendant had committed two or more racketeering acts in
furtherance of the commission's goals."103 If a defendant had not directly participated in a RICO
predicate act himself, the government sought to show authorization of the act through the
Commission body vis-d-vis his family.104  In such a scenario, the defendant would still be
"indirectly" conducting the affairs of the enterprise, which is adequate under § 1962(c).105
Figure 1: Simplified diagram of La Cosa Nostra hierarchy in 1985-1986. All named individuals were




1oo Goodwin, supra note 1, at 301-02.
101. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 80.
102 This comprised the largest number of defendants ever included in a single organized crime
indictment. Various events took place prior to trial involving certain defendants: Paul "Big Paul" Castellano, boss
of the Gambino Family, was murdered; Gambino Family underboss, Aniello "Mr. Neil" Dellaroce, died of natural
causes; and Phillip "Rusty" Rastelli, Bonanno Family boss, was severed from the case. The eight remaining
defendants included: Anthony "Fat Tony" Salerno (Genovese Family boss), Anthony "Tony Ducks" Corallo
(Lucchese Family boss), Carmine "The Snake" Persico (Colombo Family boss), Genarro "Gerry Lang" Langella
(Colombo Family underboss), Salvatore "Tom Mix" Santoro (Luccese Family underboss), Christoper "Christie
Tick" Funari (Lucchese Family consigliere), Ralph "Little Ralphie" Scopo (Colombo Family capo) and Anthony
"Bruno" Indelicato (Bonanno Family soldier). The latter two defendants were not members of the Commission, but
were included in the case because of evidence that they had executed the Commission's orders. Id. at 81.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 90.
105. 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).
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To the prosecution, the Commission comprised an "association in fact" under
§ 1961(4).106 This view was bolstered by the Supreme Court's then recent Turkette decision,
reaffirming the notion that an association in fact enterprise could be wholly criminal with no
legitimate components.107 To demonstrate that the Commission was a group of persons
associated together for the common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct, 08 the
government introduced substantial evidence laying out the history of organized crime and of the
existence of the Commission dating back to 1931.109 The indictment alleged that "the general
purpose of the Commission enterprise was to regulate and facilitate the relationships between
and among La Cosa Nostra Families."110 The indictment lists specific purposes, some of which
include joint ventures between families, resolving disputes between families regarding
"operation, conduct, and control or illegal activities," extending formal recognition to new
family bosses, approving the initiation of new members in the families, and establishing
governing rules."'
The allegations fit squarely within the prohibited activity in §1962(c), making it illegal
for a defendant merely associated with an enterprise to conduct, even indirectly, that enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.112 In this scenario, the enterprise was the
"association in fact" Commission whose purposes the defendants conducted via their pattern of
racketeering behavior.11 3 The racketeering activities serving as the predicates for the substantive
RICO violations revolved around three separate schemes: (1) the "Concrete Club," in which the
Commission and five families controlled the companies and bidding for construction contracts
involving large amounts of cement; (2) a loan-sharking operation on Staten Island; and (3) the
murder of a Bonanno Family boss to resolve an internal dispute.11 4 All of the predicate acts
furthered the broader purposes and goals of the Commission both by organizing joint ventures
amongst the families and resolving disputes between them. 115  The government successfully
convinced the jury "that the nexus of all these acts is the continuous existence both of the
Commission and its goals and means and methods of attainment of those goals."116
The defendants were ultimately found guilty of seventeen acts of racketeering, and
twenty related charges of extortion, labor payoffs, and loansharking." 7  All but one defendant
was sentenced to one hundred years in prison and each was fined up to $250,000.118 The
defendants were found guilty for their association with the Commission, which had facilitated a
number of illegal predicate acts in furtherance of its goals as an association in fact RICO
enterprise.11 9 The predicate acts constituting the pattern of racketeering did not need to have
been committed by the defendants themselves, but could have been authorized by them and
106 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 307.
107. Tarlow, supra note 21, at 325.
108 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
109. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 301.
110. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 96.
ill. Id.
112 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).
113 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 307.
114 Id. at 308-10.
115 See id. at 310.
1i1. United States v. Salerno, 1986 WL 1450, 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1986).
117. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 86.
118 Id.
119 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 310.
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performed by others.120  Such authorization was inferred by a defendant's place in La Cosa
Nostra's hierarchy.121 Thus, many argued that the government, through its use and interpretation
of RICO and the RICO association in fact enterprise, had made it possible to convict a gangster
simply for being a gangster.122
B. UNITED STATES v MILKEN
As noted earlier, an entirely legal entity can become a RICO enterprise.123 When there is
no connection to organized crime and the enterprise is a traditional commercial enterprise,
application of the statute has often been highly controversial.124 Drexel Burnham Lambert
(DBL), the enterprise at the center of the Milken case, was once a massive Wall Street
investment-banking firm in the 1980s that dealt in mergers and acquisitions. Michael Milken, as
an employee of DBL, started their high-yield bond trading department and is often cited as
creating the market for junk bonds.125 Milken and DBL organized the issuance of these junk
bonds for acquirers in order to help them raise capital to facilitate leveraged buyouts.12 6 The
cash obtained from the target corporation was then used to help pay back the holders of the
bonds in the future. Milken was wholly successful at creating markets for the bonds, which he
would issue for DBL clients.127  At one point, Michael Milken was the "most highly paid
financier in history, personally collecting more than $1.1 billion between 1983 and 1987" 128
from DBL.
The criminal RICO indictment against Michael Milken resulted from what was initially
an investigation of DBL itself.129 In the mid-1980s, the SEC began to investigate DBL based
largely on information provided by Ivan Boesky, a Drexel client who had plead guilty to
securities fraud in 1987.130 Soon after, Rudy Giuliani, the then U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, instituted a separate investigation of DBL.131 In December of 1988, DBL
plead nolo contendere to six counts of mail and securities fraud and paid $650 million in fines. 132
120. JACOBS, Supra note 97, at 90.
121 Id.
122. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 311.
123 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).
124 See Crovitz, supra note 41.
125. A junk bond is a speculative grade bond that generally has a greater risk of defaulting than
investment grade bonds, but also promises to yield a higher return for its investors.
126 Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Set to Pay a $600 Million Fine in Wall St. Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21
1990, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/21/business/milken-set-to-pay-a-600-million-fine-in-wall-st-
fraud.html?pagewanted 1.
127. * When a company was unable to obtain adequate funding by other means, often in hostile takeover
scenarios, DBL sometimes issued a "highly confident letter" assuring investors, banks or the target corporation that
it would be able to raise the money promised in a takeover bid and that the deal would be completed. The success of
such letters, which were not legally binding, reflects the skill and trust people placed in DBL and the market for junk
bonds Milken had created. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES, 114 (Simon & Schuster 1991).
128. Eichenwald, supra note 126.
129 See JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN
(William Morrow and Company 1992).
13o * The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert; Key Events for Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES,
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DBL plead to the charges because prosecutors had threatened to bring a RICO indictment in
which a number of partners would likely have been named as defendants and the firm itself as
the RICO enterprise .133 This would have led to the pre-trial seizure of firm assets to guarantee
the payment of later judgments.134 In such a scenario, investor funds could have been seized or
frozen and the investors would likely have pulled out. 135 Without the capital of its investors,
upon which the firm was dependent, DBL would surely have gone bankrupt before it was able to
defend itself against the RICO charges in court.136 At the end of the day "[t]his was the $650
million question for the board of directors of Drexel Burnham Lambert, which decided that this
amount in settlement of all the charges was a fair price to pay to avoid being RICOed."1 37
The illegal activity at DBL had allegedly occurred under Milken's direction and, as part
of the plea, he was removed from his post.138 In March of 1989, U.S. attorneys from the
Southern District charged Milken with ninety-eight counts of racketeering, securities fraud, and
mail fraud among other crimes. 139 The mail fraud and security fraud counts alone could have
served as the predicate offenses needed to prove Milken's pattern of racketeering activity. 140
Furthermore, he was employed by DBL,141 which would have served as the enterprise whose
junk bond department he had "conducted" through his racketeering as per 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).
However, none of this came to fruition as Milken plead guilty to six criminal counts and paid
$600 million in fines to avoid the potential of a 20-year prison sentence from a RICO
conviction.142 Milken was initially sentenced to a term of ten years in prison but had his
sentence reduced to two with the support of federal prosecutors who cited his cooperation. 143
The Milken case provides an example of a legal entity, DBL, which was infiltrated by a
"racketeer," Michel Milken. Semantically, this may have been the kind of scenario contemplated
by the architects of the RICO statute. However, Milken is certainly not part of an organized
crime family and the legislation's harsh penalties were probably not designed to punish a
business like DBL. Some argue that the pre-trial forfeiture remedy exists because:
[O]rganized crime, with its foreign bases of operation, has traditionally been able
not just to hide its assets but also to secretly transfer its assets outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. While this pre-trial procedure might make sense for
cases against a Mafia family or a corrupt foreign official indicted in U.S. courts, it
has perverse affects when used against legitimate businesses.144
Regardless of the intent of the statute, the broad definition of a RICO enterprise and the
133 Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1064.
134. Id.




138 Eichenwald, supra note 126.
139 Id.
140. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1).
141. Drexel Burnham Lambert, as part of its own plea deal, had agreed to cooperate with the
government's investigation of Milken.
142 Eichenwald, supra note 126.
143 Milken's Sentence Reduced by Judge; 7 Months are Left, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6 1992, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/06/business/milken-s-sentence-reduced-by-judge-7-months-are-
left.html?scp=4&sq=Michael%2OMilken%20released&st cse.
144. Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1060.
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use of predicates such as mail fraud, wire fraud and security fraud have allowed federal
prosecutors to bring charges against a variety of companies, firms and executives.14 5 Indeed, the
mere threat of a RICO indictment against the principals at a large financial institution, as was
threatened against DBL, can have disastrous effects on the firm itself through the substantial
forfeiture and asset freezing penalties.146
C. UNITED STATES V. CIANCIl 47
For twenty-one years, from 1975-1984 and from 1991-2002, Vincent A. "Buddy" Cianci
was the mayor of Providence, Rhode Island. An immensely popular figure throughout the city,
he was once described by a N.Y. Times reporter as "a kind of P.T. Barnum of Providence,
ubiquitously promoting and ushering in the makeover of its downtown."148  In 2001, Buddy
Cianci was indicted with two aides, Frank E. Corrente and Richard E. Autiello,149 for what
amounted to running the City of Providence as a criminal enterprise. 50  The four-year F.B.I
investigation that led to the indictment, nicknamed "Operation Plunder Dome," alleged that the
defendants had used various illegal means to enrich Cianci and keep him in power.1s1
The three defendants were charged with forty-six violations of federal statutes that
prohibited public corruption, two of which were substantive RICO (§1962(c)) and RICO
conspiracy (§1962(d)) charges. 152 The enterprise, as in Salerno, was an association in fact. 153
However, unlike Salerno, the association in fact in Cianci was multifaceted, containing legal and
illegal entities. 154 Here, the enterprise was alleged to have been comprised of three entities: (1)
The group of three defendants themselves (Cianci, Corrente and Autiello), (2) the City of
Providence "including, but not limited to many of its departments, offices, and agencies,"' 55 and
(3) a campaign contribution fund for Buddy Cianci under his and Corrente's control.156 The
federal indictment alleged that Cianci's enterprise existed between 1991 and 1999 for the
purposes of: (a) enriching Cianci through extortion, mail fraud, bribery, money laundering and
witness tampering, and (b) through the same means, enriching, promoting, and protecting the
power and assets of the enterprise's leaders and associates. 157  The indictment tracks the
language of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), alleging that the defendants "associated with, and conducted
145 See id.
146. For an instructive example, see Crovitz, supra note 41, at 1058-65 (describing the effect of RICO
on Princeton/Newport Partners, the first securities firm to have its officers charged with RICO violations). Also see
Indicted Securities Firm says it will Liquidate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8 1988, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/business/indicted-securities-firm-says-it-will-
liquidate. html?scp 9&sq drexel%20ando2ORICO&st=Search.
147 378 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004).
148 Pam Belluck, A Sentence for Corruption Ends an Era in Providence, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 7 2002,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/07/us/a-sentence-for-corruption-ends-an-era-in-
providence.html?pagewanted= 1.
149 Corrente was the City's Administration Director and Autiello actively solicited funds for Cianci.
15o See supra, note 147.
.5 Dan Barry, Providence Mayor is Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25 2002, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/25/us/providence-mayor-is-guilty-of-corruption.html?pagewanted=1.
152 Cianci, 378 F.3d at 77.
153 Id. at 82.
154 Id. at 79
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Cianci, 378 F.3d at 80.
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and participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs" 58 through a
pattern of racketeering which was broken down into nine separate and detailed schemes. 159
Figure 2: Diagram of the association in fact enterprise implicated in Cianci. The illegal purposes of the
entity consisting of the group of defendants were imputed to the legitimate entities in the association in
fact.
=Associatio n in Fact Enterprise J
Ultimately, Cianci was only convicted of one RICO conspiracy count.160 The
government requested that the district court submit a special verdict form to the jury containing
special interrogatories for every RICO predicate act with respect to each defendant.161 The jury
did not check off the "yes" (or guilty) box for any of the predicate acts with respect to Cianci. 162
Since there was no established pattern of racketeering, Cianci could not be convicted of a
substantive RICO charge. Nonetheless-as the First Circuit notes-for a RICO conspiracy
conviction, a defendant simply "must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would
satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopted the
goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor."1 63 Buddy Cianci was therefore found
guilty of a §1962(d) RICO conspiracy violation and sentenced to five years and four months in
prison. 64
On appeal, the defense argued that the association in fact enterprise alleged in the
indictment was a legal impossibility due to the inclusion of municipal entities, citing the
requirement that members of an association in fact share a "common unlawful purpose."165 The
defense argued that the municipal elements included in the prosecution's enterprise simply could
not act with unlawful intent and therefore could not share in the unlawful purposes of the
defendants.166 The First Circuit dismissed this argument, holding that the City, as a part of the
enterprise, was not required to have the same illegal purpose as the defendants themselves.167
The Circuit resolved the dilemma by allowing the criminal purpose to be imputed:
58 Id.
159 Id. at 80-81.
160 Corrente and Autiello were convicted on a number of other charges, with only Corrente being
found guilty of a substantive § 1962(c) RICO violation. Id. at 77.
161 Id. at 90.
162 Id.
163 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65.
164 Belluck, supra note 148.
.6 Cianci, 378 F.3d at 82. The defense relied on Turkette without directly citing the case. In fact, the
government did not contest the requirement that it show a common unlawful purpose; the government believed that
this purpose could be imputed by the defendants to the municipal entities in the association in fact.
66 Id. Here, the defense relied partly on the Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Thompson. In
that case, the court held that "Criminal activity is private activity even when it is carried out in a public forum and
even though the activity can only be undertaken by an official's use of a state given power." (Id. citing 685 F.2d
993, 1001 (6th Cir. 1982)). This argument was not accepted by the First Circuit in Cianci.
167. Cianci, 378 F.3d at 84.
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Requiring the government to prove that all members named in the enterprise
shared a common purpose of illegality did not compel the government to show
that the City itself had the mens rea to seek bribes and to extort. . . . Unlawful
common purpose is imputed to the City by way of the individual defendant's
control, influence, and manipulation of the City for their illicit ends.168
In permitting the common purpose of the associated in fact enterprise to be imputed to
the City and its agencies by the defendants, the Circuit took an expansive view of the
RICO enterprise element. 169
V. CONCLUSION
In constructing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Congress
utilized language that has facilitated the law's application in a variety of situations and against a
broad spectrum of defendants. A number of elements needed to successfully prosecute a
defendant in a criminal RICO case are highly adaptable to the government's needs. The
enterprise element is representative of this adaptability and best demonstrates the diversity of
targets and entities implicated.
The Commission Purely Illegal Association in Fact
Milken Drexel Burnham Lambert Legal
Cianci Defendants; City of Providence; Association in Fact (legal and illegal)
Friends of Cianci
While many commentators argue that RICO was not meant to be applied in certain
situations or against certain defendants, its power as a weapon against "racketeers" of all stripes
cannot be doubted. Until the Supreme Court sets a firm precedent with respect to the law's use,
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